Categoria: Politics

The Gospel and the Guillotine of Indifference

A Chronicle of Convenient Christendom

There are days in Brasil when the morning headlines feel like parables rewritten by the wrong disciples — stories where virtue is loudly proclaimed and quietly abandoned, where the name of Christ is invoked like a campaign slogan, and where the gospel is wielded not as a moral compass but as a cudgel. One might call it hypocrisy, but even that word seems too gentle for the scale of the dissonance.

Some days the sun seems almost accusatory, illuminating everything with an honesty no one asked for. On such a day, I sat with Dilexi te on Love for the Poor open on my lap, as if it were a lantern in the middle of a fog that our politics insist on thickening. Pope Leo XIV writes as one who has walked among the poor, not above them. He speaks of structural sin, of systems that grind the faces of the vulnerable until they forget they were ever children of god.

Brasil’s contemporary right wing—whether dressed in the corporate suits of the União Brasil, the punitive rhetoric of PL, or the nostalgia-soaked moralism of Republicanos — moves through public life like a procession of pharisees convinced they alone possess divine authority. Yet their actions betray them at every turn.

They demand obedience to scripture while ignoring its first lesson: compassion.

They praise the sanctity of life while defending policies that routinely abandon living, breathing human beings.

They speak of family while endorsing economic structures that grind families into precarity.

It is a theatre of selective morality — one in which Jesus is constantly quoted, yet rarely followed.

The Poverty of Mercy

Consider the passionate speeches about protecting the poor delivered by politicians who vote consistently against welfare expansion, against food assistance, against housing programmes, and in favour of regressive tax structures that place the heaviest burdens precisely on those Christ identified as his own. If Christ is the shepherd, the brasilian right often behaves like hired hands who, seeing the wolf of poverty approach, simply shut the door and retreat into gated communities.

The PL’s relentless push for austerity, presented as fiscal responsibility, reads more like an extended footnote to the biblical story of the rich young ruler — except in this version, the ruler not only refuses to give up his wealth but also demands that the poor surrender theirs as well.

The Cult of Vengeance

Christianity teaches forgiveness, mercy, the dignity of every human soul. Yet one finds among the right a fixationv — bordering on obsession — with punitive policing, harsher sentencing, and a fantasy of righteous violence. As if Christ, confronted with the adulterous woman, would have ordered the first stone to be thrown with military precision and broadcast on national television.

The law-and-order rhetoric of parties like Republicanos and figures aligned with the evangelical bloc is not a defence of justice but a performance of power. It sanctifies brutality, canonises the police bullet, and declares entire communities unworthy of redemption. When the children of favelas are treated as collateral damage, and when politicians respond with statistical shrugs, one sees not christianity but its grotesque inversion.

Mammon’s Most Faithful Servants

The gospel could not be clearer: “You cannot serve God and Mammon.”
Yet in the brasilian right, Mammon appears not only served but enthroned.

The alliance between right-wing parties and extractive industries — agribusiness, mining conglomerates, and deforestation giants — would make even the golden calf blush. Environmental destruction is justified with a theological flair: god, they say, “gave us the land to use,” conveniently forgetting that he did not instruct humankind to pillage it to exhaustion.

The ruralista bloc prays loudly on sunday only to vote on monday for everything that accelerates environmental collapse and undermines indigenous survival. They claim stewardship; they practise exploitation.

The Gospel According to the Market

Jesus expelled the money-changers from the temple; the brasilian right invites them back with tax incentives.
The neoliberal creed — repeated like a litany by sectors of Novo, União Brasil, and the corporate wing of the right — declares that the market will heal all wounds. But the market has never healed a wound; it merely calculates its profitability.

And still they insist that privatisation is salvation, deregulation is redemption, and austerity is good news for the poor — though only the poor are ever asked to sacrifice.

If Christ multiplied bread and fish, the modern right atomises it, repackages it through private intermediaries, and sells it back with high interest.

A Christ Retrofitted for Power

Perhaps the most audacious act is the political renovation of Jesus himself.
The carpenter of Nazareth, who walked among the marginalised, is repurposed as a nationalist icon; the pacifist prophet becomes a mascot for gun culture; the agitator against empire is recast as a defender of authoritarian strongmen.

It is a theological manoeuvre so cynical it borders on artistry.

The bolsonarista wing in particular has perfected this tactic: turning faith into branding, liturgy into propaganda, pastors into political technicians. In their hands, christianity becomes less a spiritual tradition and more a marketing franchise — its product line including outrage, fear, and the constant promise of moral superiority.

The Chronicle’s Closing Note

One need not be christian to recognise the tragedy. It is literary, almost Shakespearean: a cast of characters convinced they are protagonists of a divine narrative, failing to notice that they are the antagonists in their own story.

They speak of Christ with patriotic fervour, but when confronted with his actual teachings, they behave like officials inspecting forged documents. This Christ is inconvenient, they seem to say. Let us remodel him.

And so they do.

They craft a Christ who hates precisely the people the historical Jesus embraced.
A Christ who blesses militias, applauds evictions, and nods approvingly at environmental plunder.
A Christ who resembles not the saviour of the gospels but the leaders who invoke his name.

It is not merely hypocrisy.
It is heresy disguised as patriotism.
A chronicle of moral dissonance so loud it drowns out the very Gospel they claim to protect.

And the irony is almost biblical:
in trying to claim Christ for themselves, they have wandered farther from him than they dare admit.

The bible warns that we will know a tree by its fruits.
The fruits of compassion, dignity, and solidarity are more abundant among those who seek to lift the poor, rather than blame them.

Perhaps, one day, under a gentler sun, the two rivers — faith and politics — may finally merge. But only if we acknowledge the distance between Christ’s words and the policies of those who most claim to speak in his name.

The Pedagogy of Becoming: Paulo Freire and the Crisis of Consciousness in Contemporary Brasil

In the present hour of Brasilian education, Paulo Freire’s voice resounds like a distant thunder — familiar, yet increasingly ignored by those who govern the nation’s schools. His vision of conscientização, the awakening of critical consciousness, has never been more necessary, nor more endangered. The new model of secondary education — ostensibly designed to offer “flexibility” and “career readiness” — reveals itself instead as a quiet betrayal of Freire’s emancipatory dream. Under the rhetoric of modernisation lies a pedagogy of resignation, one that trains rather than educates, conditions rather than liberates.

Freire taught that education is never neutral. It either domesticates or humanises; it either reproduces the world as it is or transforms it through dialogue and reflection. The restructured Ensino Médio, with its utilitarian emphasis on “skills”, “employability”, and “efficiency”, signals a shift from formation to function, from thought to task. The student ceases to be a subject of knowledge and becomes a consumer of competencies. It is, in essence, the banking model of education reborn in neoliberal attire.

This quiet transformation parallels Antonio Gramsci’s warning about cultural hegemony: the ruling class need not impose ideology by force if it can shape the curriculum. The promise of “choice” within the new system — allowing students to select “itineraries” of study — conceals an absence of real agency. How can one choose freely when the horizon of possibilities has already been narrowed by economic necessity? As Hannah Arendt once observed, “education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it.” Yet the new educational order loves only productivity, not the world.

In this new landscape, philosophy, sociology, and arts — the disciplines that teach students to question, to imagine, to dissent — are increasingly marginalised, framed as luxuries for the few. What remains is a curriculum stripped of doubt, designed to produce compliance in the name of adaptability. Here, Freire’s pedagogy of hope meets its antagonist: a pedagogy of market logic, where dialogue is replaced by metrics and the word “critical” is quietly excised from the vocabulary of learning.

Freire’s insight that “to speak a true word is to transform the world” feels subversive again. In a society fractured by misinformation and social inequality, the cultivation of critical consciousness is not a privilege — it is a form of resistance. The new Ensino Médio threatens to extinguish this resistance at its root, converting schools into training grounds for precarious futures. Students are told they are free to choose, yet they are not free to think deeply about why their choices exist in the first place.

Jean-Paul Sartre wrote that we are “condemned to be free” — that freedom carries with it the burden of responsibility and reflection. The contemporary educational system, however, seeks to relieve students of this burden, offering instead the comfort of superficial certainty. It trades the existential struggle for meaning for a checklist of competencies. It replaces Freire’s dialogical encounter with the algorithmic logic of standardised assessment.

And yet, beneath this mechanisation, the human hunger for meaning persists. In classrooms across Brasil, teachers — often underpaid, undervalued, yet profoundly committed — continue to create small revolutions of thought. They invite students to speak, to question, to name the world. These moments of resistance recall Freire’s belief that education is an act of love, and that love, in its truest form, is revolutionary.

The crisis of Brasilian education is therefore not merely pedagogical — it is ontological. It reflects a broader societal fear of genuine thinking, a preference for obedience over awareness. Freire warned that the oppressed internalise the logic of their oppressors; now, perhaps, the students of Brasil are being taught to internalise the logic of the market. Against this tide, the Freirean project remains a radical affirmation of humanity: that to educate is to believe in the capacity of every person to read the world, not merely to navigate it.

If Brasil’s future is to be more than efficient—if it is to be just, conscious, and alive—it must return to the difficult art of dialogue, the courage of reflection, and the dream of a pedagogy that teaches not what to think, but how to think. Only then will Freire’s vision cease to be a memory and become once more a movement.

The north winds don’t move windmills

Os ventos do norte
Não movem moinhos
E o que me resta
É só um gemido

Minha vida, meus mortos
Meus caminhos tortos
Meu sangue latino
Minh’alma cativa

Rompi tratados
Traí os ritos
Quebrei a lança
Lancei no espaço
Um grito, um desabafo

E o que me importa
É não estar vencido


Sangue Latino, Ney Matogrosso

It is therefore unsurprising that Trump should advocate for Brazil to once again become the United States’ backyard. In order to ensure this, the country has been responsible for causing political and economic instability in Brazil since at least the 1950s. This can be verified in official US government documents that have been declassified.

Brazil possesses a number of strategic resources, including rare minerals and metals (utilised in the manufacture of high-strength alloys for military, aerospace and energy industries), oil and gas, and agricultural products (for which Brazil is a key player in the global chain). In addition, the country has water resources and biodiversity, as evidenced by the Amazon rainforest and the Guarani aquifer (which, in addition to the resources themselves, are also fundamental to the planet’s climate and environmental regulation).

Moreover, Brazil stands as the most expansive nation in Latin America, boasting an extensive coastline along the South Atlantic, a region of paramount importance due to its strategic significance for commercial and military routes. The Brazilian coastline is also subject to the jurisdiction of exclusive maritime economic zones, which extend over strategic resources such as offshore oil.

At this juncture, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the interference and sabotage perpetrated by the US is intended to facilitate the acquisition of strategic assets, with a particular emphasis on the rare earths recently discovered in Minas Gerais.

The deliberate orchestration of an economic crisis serves as a pivotal catalyst for the initiation of forced privatisations, which in turn facilitate the unregulated entry of historically protected sectors, including but not limited to energy, mining, and infrastructure. During the 1990s, strategic sectors were privatised due to the implementation of neoliberal reforms and the involvement of foreign capital, notably from the United States.

Furthermore, it is important to highlight the US interest in weakening BRICS, which has emerged as a strong economic bloc, possibly surpassing other free trade areas.

The utilisation of historical evidence in conjunction with official documents from the US government facilitates the reconstruction of a chronology:

1950 – mid-1963: The Cold War
In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the United States began to perceive Latin America as a region susceptible to communist expansion. The United States employed political support and the influence of local elites to finance business groups, thereby exerting economic pressure through credit and trade policies. In this manner, the US established itself as a significant influence on the Brazilian political and military elites.

1964: The overthrow of President João Goulart by a military coup d’état

The US ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, transmitted a confidential communication to the US government, articulating grave concerns regarding the government of João Goulart and proposing specific actions:

It is evident that President Goulart is collaborating with the Brazilian Communist Party with the objective of ‘seizing dictatorial power’. Furthermore, it is recommended that ‘a clandestine delivery of arms’ be made available to Branco’s supporters, in addition to a shipment of gas and oil, with a view to facilitating the success of the coup forces. It is imperative to prepare without delay for the possibility of overt intervention at a subsequent stage.

The declassification of documents has provided insights into Operation Brother Sam, a military plan devised by the American military to provide support for the overthrow of the Brazilian government by military means. This operation involved the deployment of naval vessels and aircraft that were prepared for immediate deployment.

The Operation Brother Sam deployment comprised the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, six destroyers, four tankers, seven C-135 aircraft, fighter jets, weapons and ammunition. However, the opposition military in Brazil swiftly deposed the Goulart government, thereby rendering the operation ineffective in Brazil.

The US government provided overt political support to the military and played an active role in the provision of information and signalling immediate recognition of the coup regime. Furthermore, the US government offered indirect support in the form of logistics. According to materials compiled by the National Security Archive and the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), leaders in Washington worked to “facilitate” the success of the coup.

1964–1985: The consolidation of the dictatorship and the acts of sabotage against communism

The Mann Doctrine (1926) established pragmatic criteria: the tolerance of pro-American dictators and the combatting of communists. It was officially advised that the nature of regimes should not be a subject of inquiry; rather, support should be extended to those regimes which were aligned with US interests.

The policy in question stipulated a non-interventionist approach towards dictators, provided they demonstrated a favourable disposition towards US business interests. Conversely, it called for intervention against Communists, irrespective of their specific policies. In addition, it is important to note that: US operatives interpreted the Mann Doctrine of 18 March as a ‘green light’ for the coup to proceed.

The military regime established repressive institutions and aligned itself with the anti-communist agenda of the US. In the 1970s, South American dictatorships collaborated in transnational repression operations, which came to be known as Operation Condor. The operation was facilitated by the complicity of local services and, to varying degrees, by support and information circulating through channels aligned with the US government.

In this particular context, interventions did not invariably take the form of military action; rather, they encompassed economic boycotts, withdrawal and conditioning of credit, and support for campaigns by entities that served to weaken nationalist governments. It is evident that opposition organisations were financed, and pressure was exerted on capital flows, thereby strengthening the destabilisation of governments considered “dangerous” by Washington.

A review of historical evidence reveals the existence of campaign financing and think tanks, in addition to diplomatic actions aimed at isolating governments that did not align with the regime stipulated by the US.

The late 1990s to 2010 period: The influence has undergone a process of attenuation, yet it remains an ever-present phenomenon, exerting its influence through the medium of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks

In the context of redemocratisation, the US succeeded in consolidating its influence through a variety of channels, including diplomatic and institutional mechanisms (with a particular emphasis on military, technological and educational cooperation). Additionally, private actors such as NGOs and think tanks played a significant role in propagating doctrines imported from Washington. This influence functioned as a template for the political and economic environment, albeit in a more discreet manner than during the years of military dictatorship, yet always in a pervasive way.

2011–2016: The present study will examine the government of Dilma Rousseff and the onset of a political crisis

The political agenda of Dilma Rousseff (PT) was characterised by the implementation of policies aimed at promoting social expansion and the resumption of South-South cooperation. The crisis that led to impeachment (2015–2016) had complex internal causes, including a deteriorating economy, corruption scandals (Operation Car Wash), the breakdown of coalition bases, and strong political polarisation. It is evident that prominent figures within the Car Wash judicial apparatus have been observed to engage in collaborative endeavours with the US government, with the objective of subverting the political agenda of the Dilma administration.

It is evident that a number of researchers and analysts (including, it is worth noting, a “long coup“) have documented the fact that a section of the 2015–2016 process combined internal action (in the media, the Attorney General’s Office and Congress) with disinformation and the fomenting of protests. Furthermore, a number of studies and articles argue that there was also external influence (exchange of information, support from transnational conservative networks, training of political movements).

Nevertheless, the evidence of direct intervention by Washington to force impeachment is less compelling than in the case of 1964. The impeachment was primarily the result of internal right-wing actors, with the echo of international right-wing networks and actors.

It is crucial to emphasise the manner in which transnational media networks and conservative groups that are opposed to governments with populist agendas, such as those that were in power during the PT years, have amplified alleged scandals.

2016–2018: Long coup and rise of the right

Recent research describes a prolonged process (media discourse, judicialisation, leaks, and reputation operations) that paved the way for extreme polarisation and the rise to power of radical right-wing candidates in 2018. There are academic works and journalistic investigations that document connections between Brazilian conservative networks and international actors (consultancies, digital platforms, influencers), which were decisive in constructing anti-PT narratives. The literature debates how much of this articulation was an external initiative versus an internal opportunity. Figures such as Steve Bannon were decisive in the election results, as was the adoption of communication strategies inspired by Trumpism.

2018–2022: The worst possible president and the most abject person on the planet come to power

Jair Bolsonaro won the 2018 elections largely through a campaign that exploited digital networks, influencers, and an anti-establishment platform. During and after the campaign, there were visible contacts with figures from the conservative/alt-right political environment in the US (e.g., Steve Bannon and ideological allies) and rhetorical alignment with the Trump administration. This transnational network encouraged communication strategies, framing, and allegations of electoral “fraud,” as well as symbolic and image support.

2022–2025 — Post-Bolsonaro defeat, flight from the country, accusations and international pressure
After losing in 2022, Bolsonaro was the target of investigations in Brazil (linked to attempts to destabilise the 2022 electoral process and plans for a coup). Part of the Bolsonaro family and allies fled seeking shelter and coordination abroad (including the US), seeking political and legal support.

Journalistic sources document meetings and attempts to influence US authorities to pressure the Brazilian government against legal proceedings in favour of Bolsonaro. In 2025, there was a clear escalation in the Trump administration’s actions regarding the Bolsonaro case: President Trump insulted the Brazilian judicial process, classified the investigations against Bolsonaro as “persecution,” sanctioned or threatened measures (punitive tariffs on Brazilian imports, sanctions against Brazilian authorities involved in Bolsonaro’s trial), and denounced the actions of judges as politically motivated. (Sources: Reuters, Washington Post, Financial Times, Guardian, and official White House documents/communiqués).

Journalistic investigations and contemporary reports show that members of the Bolsonaro family (notably Eduardo Bolsonaro) have maintained direct contact with officials and advisers in the US, seeking to persuade the American government to intervene — for example, by suggesting sanctions against Brazilian judges and encouraging measures such as tariff increases in retaliation for judicial decisions in Brazil. Reports have attributed to Eduardo the role of “bridge” to the Trump administration to obtain external pressure against the Brazilian judiciary. These actions have been interpreted by critics as clear attempts to influence Brazilian national sovereignty, using the power of another state to interfere in internal processes. There are also public statements and posts by family members favouring American measures.

In contemporary Brazil, the Bolsonaro family and their supporters are regarded as emblematic of the nation’s prevailing socio-political challenges. They are often accused of engaging in corrupt practices, betraying their principles, and prioritising their own agendas over the broader interests of the nation.

The present situation can be likened to a state of waiting, in which the only action available is to observe the progression of the legal proceedings. It is hoped that the results of the 2026 elections will be a more accurate reflection of the will of the Brazilian people, and that they will be less influenced by external factors, such as those emanating from Washington.

As the march that is poised to be the highlight of the 2026 carnival asserts, on a free translation:


You can raise taxes,
You can kick and scream,
You can send letters,
You can threaten,
Here you don't call the shots
Here we are tough
We eat oranges
We burn fascists!
O Trumpi, salva meu pai!

Listen here the song.

Minhas considerações sobre o processo eleitoral brasileiro

1. “Eleição não se ganha, se toma”


Luís Roberto Barroso, magistrado, atualmente é o 61 presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Até 2022, foi o presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, a instância máxima da Justiça Eleitoral Brasileira. O TSE, juntamente com os TREs, constitui o sistema judiciário eleitoral do Brasil.

No dia 11 de abril de 2023, a frase “Eleição não se ganha, se toma” foi atribuída ao mesmo. Tal declaração foi feita durante a aula inaugural do curso Democracia e Combate à Desinformação, promovida pela Escola Superior da Advocacia-Geral da União.

A íntegra da aula está disponível no link. Na ocasião, o magistrado reiterou que o papel das cortes supremas é justamente a aceitação do pluralismo e a manutenção da vontade das maiorias. No trecho disponível em link, após ironizar notícias falsas sobre uma suposta orgia que ele frequentou em Cuba com José Dirceu, citou a frase, “eleição não se ganha, se toma”

Em vídeo disponível no canal da Câmara dos Deputados, em 09 de junho de 2021, Barroso, em conversa com o Deputado Jhonatan de Jesus, filho de Mecias de Jesus, ambos do estado de Roraima, proferiu a frase “Em Roraima, eleição não se ganha, se toma”, fazendo referência a reclamações feitas por Mecias, senador do estado. Nessa ocasião, Mecias havia lhe dito que antes da implantação do voto eletrônico, as eleições “lhe foram tomadas” duas vezes. Em vídeo amplamente divulgado, a palavra “Roraima” foi suprimida.

Uma pesquisa do Senado brasileiro apontou que, atualmente, 79% da população tem o aplicativo de mensagens WhatsApp como principal fonte de notícias. A desinformação, portanto, tornou-se uma estratégia política.

2. Supostas discrepâncias de dados fornecidos pelo STE e indisponibilidade de acesso aos dados brutos

Desde 1997, a Lei das Eleições já determinava que partidos e coligações deveriam fazer parte da fiscalização de todas as fases do processo eleitoral, incluindo a votação e a apuração das eleições, bem como o processamento eletrônico da totalização dos resultados. A legislação em questão pode ser consultada no artigo 66 da Lei n. 9.504/1997. O processo eleitoral é aberto à fiscalização de mais de uma centena de entidades representativas da sociedade civil, as quais podem verificar os boletins de urna (BU), o Digital do Voto (RDV) e o log de urnas em até 100 dias após a eleição.

Ademais, qualquer cidadão brasileiro maior de idade tem a possibilidade de participar do TPS (Teste Público de Segurança), que se encontra em funcionamento desde 2019. Desde a primeira edição, nenhuma vulnerabilidade capaz de comprometer o resultado das eleições foi encontrada.

Durante a cerimônia de preparação das urnas, as entidades fiscalizadoras, dentre as quais se incluem partidos políticos, polícia federal, sociedade brasileira de computação, universidades e OAB, podem auditar até 6% das urnas já preparadas em cada zona eleitoral. O código-fonte das urnas é aberto para fiscalização e pode ser inspecionado cerca de um ano antes da data das eleições até a cerimônia de lacração dos sistemas, que acontece em agosto de cada ano eleitoral. Após a cerimônia, os executáveis utilizados são gravados em mídia não regravável e armazenados na sala cofre do TSE.

Há também um teste de integridade, realizado nas vésperas das eleições por entidades fiscalizadoras. As urnas selecionadas pelas entidades são retiradas dos locais de votação e encaminhadas a um local de auditoria. As urnas então são liberadas para identificação biométrica de eleitores voluntários de entidades verificadoras e em cédulas de papel. Após a conclusão do processo, é realizada uma comparação dos dados de voto para checagem. O processo é meticulosamente registrado em vídeo. Desde o primeiro teste de integridade, realizado em 2002, não foi observada qualquer discrepância nos resultados.

No dia da eleição, antes do início da votação, é realizado o Teste de Autenticidade, que consiste em uma verificação dos resumos digitais dos sistemas eleitorais de urnas instaladas em seções eleitorais.

Esses resumos, ou hashes, códigos únicos que correspondem especificamente a cada programa do sistema eleitoral, também estão disponíveis para consulta online por meio do endereço eletrônico: link.

Todos os votos são salvos no Registro Digital do Voto (RDV), protegido por camadas de segurança (assinaturas digitais, criptografia, hashes). 

O Boletim de Urna também possibilita a recontagem e a verificação dos votos. A impressão do Boletim é realizada ao término da votação, em todas as urnas, apresentando a apuração de cada equipamento. A consulta desses dados é aberta ao público, permitindo a realização de apurações paralelas. 

É possível checar as alterações nas páginas do TSE ao final de cada processo eleitoral utilizando ferramentas como o Way Back Machine, na seção “Changes“. 

Após minha análise dos dados publicados após a eleição presidencial de 2022, não encontrei nenhuma alteração, nem qualquer outra informação sobre urnas com resultados unânimes ou discrepâncias em séries temporais. 

Para a análise, utilizei as ferramentas Biostat, Digitizelt e Prism. 

Atualmente, estou elaborando gráficos no software Qlik e planejo atualizar a publicação com os dados em breve.

3. Censura do STE a contestações dos resultados das urnas

Criar e divulgar fake news no Brasil é considerado crime, podendo ser punido de acordo com o código penal e outras leis específicas. Não encontrei dados sobre suposta censura de análises verificáveis, apenas a retirada de conteúdo comprovadamente falso sendo divulgado online. 

Sugiro leituras sobre interferência internacional comprovada, como esse disponível no jornal francês Le Monde Diplomatique e posteriores leituras no tópico Cambridge Analytica. 

A ligação da direita brasileira, notória divulgadora de notícias falsas sobre a segurança e validade das eleições brasileiras, com Steve Bannon é bem documentada e pode ser acessada amplamente, mas deixo aqui a sugestão de leitura de um texto disponível no El País.

4. Registro e contagem de votos

No dia da eleição, na abertura das seções, todas as urnas emitem a zerésima, um relatório em papel que contém a identificação única da urna e comprovante de que nela estão registrados todos os candidatos, além da prova de que todos os candidatos registrados tem o número de votos zerado.

Os votos são armazenados em duas mídias, uma memória interna e outra externa, afim de garantir redundância e a possibilidade de realização de processos de contingência em caso de defeito do equipamento e necessária substituição da urna. Todos os programas dentro da urna eletrônica possuem assinatura digital e os equipamentos são lacrados.

A mídia de resultado contém os dados de toda a votação, e ao final do processo é impresso cinco vias obrigatórias do boletim de urna (com a possibilidade de impressão de cinco vias adicionais). Das vias obrigatórias, uma é destinada à fiscalização, uma entregue ao presidente da seção eleitoral, duas anexadas à ata da sessão, que é enviada ao cartório eleitoral, e a última é fixada em local visível da seção eleitoral para apreciação pública. 

Após a impressão do boletim de urna a mídia de resultado é enviada aos polos de transmissão, onde os dados são coletados pelo TSE através do Sistema Transportador.

Uma vez que as informações chegam ao servidor central, é feita verificação da assinatura digital e então verificações de inconsistência. Se houver divergência, como por exemplo no número de votos e na quantidade de eleitores que compareceram em cada seção, o boletim de urna é descartado. 

A mesma versão do programa é usada em todos os locais de voto, incluindo os fora de território eleitoral e podem ser auditados para verificação de integridade e autenticidade.

Os dados de voto só podem ser lidos por equipamentos da Justiça Eleitoral, com chaves específicas para cada camada de segurança presente. Desta forma, a autenticidade dos votos é checada duas vezes, na zona eleitoral e no TSE, antes de serem incluídos na totalização.

Consegui acessar e verificar todos os dados da eleição de 2022 disponíveis no site do TSE e não encontrei nenhuma discrepância.