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  • A CIA tale (or: “a little bit of the US interference in LATAM”)

    A long, long time ago, the US declared a strategic goal: to mess with the autonomic development of Brazil (and, after that, the whole Latin America.

    It’s no coincidence that Trump recently declared that Brazil should return to being ‘America’s backyard’*.

    For more than a century, the US doctrine has been based on the idea that Latin America should always be under their influence.

    When the US Republicans finally succeeded in abolishing the Brazilian monarchy — the last one in LATAM — they believed that the US would see them as a source of inspiration and a saviour who would kindly help to solve all the country’s problems.

    This is obviously far from the truth.

    The brazilian Republicans were in power during Brazil’s transition from empire to republic, and they were faced with a bitter reality. The US was rather disinterested in this new regime. Even worse, it became clear that the sole objective was to expand US territory in Latin America.

    Getúlio Vargas, the 14th and 17th president of Brazil (who had the infamous reputation of being an ally of Nazi Germany), promoted a rupture with the oligarchic republic that served the wishes of the US. The opposition then sought foreign intervention. If you follow the news, you may notice a recurring pattern: it’s the same strategy used by Bolsonaro’s militia now. Brazilian politicians would periodically travel to the US to beg for support in staging a coup.

    Vargas was chaotic, but he did seem to support nationalism. At the same time, he kept the country in a ‘neutral’ position, opposing both US and URSS intervention.

    Seeking to forge an independent path and improve negotiation leverage with both sides of the Cold War was a decisive moment in the US changing its partnership with Brazil for other countries in the region, such as Colombia and Venezuela.

    Brazilian participation in the Second World War — a contradiction in itself, given that Vargas would rather have remained neutral — raised expectations of strong US support and investment in Brazilian industry. This didn’t happen, however, except for the CSN (the national steel company).

    Popular frustration with US promises paved the way for the nationalism of João Goulart and Leonel Brizola. This new form of nationalism, seen by the US as radical, was perceived as a major strategic threat. Both presidents were monitored and their communications were bugged.

    In 1964, a military coup occurred. They finally managed to gain US support since they believed that Brazilian nationalist bias would pose a threat to US interests in the region. The goal was to create local competitors and promote Brazil’s autonomous development.

    Nevertheless, the military finally realised that US interests in Brazil were not the same as those in Europe under the Marshall Plan. The investments and innovations promised to the Western bloc against the communists never materialised in Brazil.

    This fuelled frustration during a population boom, which in turn resulted in a large number of people living in poverty. This led the generals to adopt a more pragmatic approach to international relations, including reopening relations with communist China.

    Ernesto Geisel was obsessed with development and championed the idea of ‘Grande Brasil’, seeking partnerships with countries with which the Brazilian dictatorship had no existing connections. This marked the beginning of the weakening of the military’s grip on power.

    The gradual process of Brazil reopening during the 1970s was greatly influenced by the revolutionary wave that occurred in the Western bloc during the 1960s. This sparked popular discussions on anti-racism, gender and decolonisation. Leonel Brizola was the face of this revolution. This marked the beginning of a new left-wing party in Brazil. Inspired by May ’68 in France and the Communist uprising in Italy, PT gained traction.

    There were two main groups in opposition to the military dictatorship that praised the US: The workers, who were isolationist and rejected any alignment, and the internationalists, who argued that Brazil should join the communist bloc.

    The Communist Party and PT were clearly internationalists. Brizola was an isolationist who defended nationalism.

    The lefties fought against the same adversary: the subservient right wing, corrupted by foreign influence, which would often use technology and support from Washington to increase internal tension in the country.

    The Communist Party and the PT sought alliances with left-leaning countries, primarily the USSR, in the hope of combatting US intervention. Brizola was sceptical.

    The workers believed that both the US and the USSR would exacerbate internal divisions and that this would impede the formation of a united workers’ group with the main goal of developing the nation.

    Brizola allied himself with high-level businessmen, but did not form partnerships with leaders of the black and native movements. His main goal was to develop the poorer classes.

    The dissolution of the USSR weakened the left’s foreign allies, affecting their ability to maintain a local dispute with right-wing US allies who also had Israeli technological support.

    As the allies were a weakened force, the Brazilian left became more isolationist.

    Nevertheless, the US continued to interfere in Latin America, and leaders such as Correa, Cristina, Chávez, Evo Morales, Humala, Castillo and Lula were imprisoned following coordinated interference by the US and its counter-intelligence apparatus.

    During the 2000s, left-nationalists were falling victim to similar operations, where corruption allegations were selectively used to discredit those calling for national sovereignty.

    Recently, US technology has caused US-style phenomena in Latin America, such as the rise of US puppets like Bukele, Milei and Bolsonaro. Fake news, mass shooting software and the manipulation of public opinion are still being used.

    Bolsonaro was a low-level politician with no significant achievements, but after US influence, he was elected president (even then, he continued to speak out against electronic voting systems). He never hid the fact that he was a mediocre, ignorant man, but his controversial views turned into massive success — and right-wing views such as racism, classism and other problematic themes gained popularity. The same happened with Milei in Argentina.

    So, it’s safe to say that US actions against Brazil are nothing new. They have been interfering in our internal affairs for decades. It’s the same old strategy: A group of politicians, judges and military personnel are co-opted and sell the nation for a low price.

    The left is facing the same dilemma again: as Brizola discussed with communists and later with the PT, should we fight against US interference by denouncing it and appealing to Brazilian nationalism and patriotism, or should we seek international support?

    Will a discourse of nationalism have any traction outside the left bubble? Would it be better to seek international support to balance the dispute?

    Would China compromise some of their interests to support allies such as Brazil?

    Paz entre nós, guerra aos senhores.

    *America is a continent, not a country.


  • Sixto Rodriguez

    I’ve lost my grandfather when I was in college. Strangely enough, I don’t remember exactly when it was. The year, the month, the day. It all slipped away into a jumble of half-remembered things that I tried to repress for so long.

     

    But there are things I remember: the smell of the hospital corridors and the sound of him in pain. I remember the morphine and me arguing with the doctors who weren’t treating him properly. The last album we heard together:

     

    ‘Cold Fact’ by Sixto Rodriguez.

     

    Don’t say anymore

    Just walk out the door

    I’ll get along fine

    You’ll see

    If there was a word

    But magic’s absurd

    I’d make one dream come true

    It didn’t work out

    But don’t ever doubt

    How I felt about you

    But thanks for your time

    Then you can thank me for mine

    And after that’s said

    Forget it

     


  • A history in five acts – Interlude

    The financial implications of a coup must be thoroughly examined. So, how much does a coup coasts?

    In April 1953, the CIA was granted a budget of 1,000,000 US dollars to fund the operation. This could be used in any way to overthrow Mosaddegh. Another important factor influencing US interests was the fear of a communist takeover and its spread in the region due to the growing influence of the Communist Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union.

    As usual, the US decided that it should control a larger share of Iranian oil supplies.

    Operation Ajax, also known as TPAJAX, was conceived and executed by the US Embassy in Tehran. The operation had four main parts:

    • A massive propaganda campaign to ruin Mosaddegh’s reputation and accuse him of having communist affiliations
    • Encouraging disturbances within Iran
    • Put pressure on the Shah to select a prime minister to replace Mosaddegh
    • Support Zahedi as Mosaddegh’s replacement

    The operation was a collaboration between the CIA, the British government and the Shah, coordinated with his twin sister, Princess Ashraf.

    Moreover, an internal CIA memorandum, entitled “Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran”, specifies that one of the CIA’s primary objectives in Iran was to “disenchant the Iranian population with the myth of Mossadegh’s patriotism, by exposing his collaboration with the Communists and his manipulation of constitutional authority to serve his own personal ambitions for power.”

    The reputation of Mosaddegh was subject to deterioration as a consequence of propaganda campaigns that erroneously associated him with communism and denigrated the Iranian people. A plot was initiated with the objective of deposing the democratically elected leader.

    The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allocated a significant budget to facilitate the operation. The final cost is estimated to vary between $100,000 and $20 million, depending on the expenses to be counted. Following the overthrow of the Zahedi government, the Central Intelligence Agency provided the new regime with $5 million, with Zahedi himself receiving an additional $1 million.

    The consequences of the coup was the subsequent Iranian Revolution (1979), which occurred 25 years later, resulted in the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran that was anti-Western and based on the concept of Velâyat-e Faqih .1

    The following discussion will explore the manner in which the 1953 coup d’état established the foundations for the 1979 revolution.

    • 1. Deepened Anti-Western Sentiment

    The Iranian populace viewed the coup as a brazen act of foreign interference, which undermined national sovereignty and served to reinforce the prevailing perception of Western powers as both hostile and exploitative. This sentiment found resonance with various groups, including religious leaders and intellectuals, who perceived the coup as a symbol of Western dominance and a betrayal of Iranian interests.

    • 2. The Shah’s authority was strengthened.

    The military takeover effectively reinstated the Shah to his former position of authority, thereby removing a popularly elected leader and consolidating the monarchy’s hold on power. However, this also resulted in the deepening of the Shah’s reliance on Western powers, thereby engendering a sense of resentment among a significant proportion of the Iranian populace who perceived the Shah as having become a puppet of foreign interests.

    • 3. Fueled Nationalist and Islamist Movements

    The coup provided a unifying catalyst for both the burgeoning nationalist and Islamist movements that were experiencing a period of heightened popularity in the 1950s and 1960s. These movements regarded the Shah’s pro-Western policies and his reliance on the military as a betrayal of Iranian values and national interests.

    • 4. The creation of a vacuum of legitimacy was a key element of the strategy.

    The Shah’s government lost its legitimacy as a result of the coup, and an alternative political and religious groups were able to gain influence due to the vacuum of leadership that was created. This vacuum was subsequently filled by Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters, who successfully exploited the anti-establishment sentiment and the Shah’s waning popularity.

    • 5. The catalyst for the Iranian Revolution.

    The sequence of events that led to the 1953 coup, in combination with the Shah’s escalatingly authoritarian policies and his mounting unpopularity, engendered a conducive environment for revolutionary action. The revolution, which commenced in 1978, ultimately succeeded in overthrowing the Shah and establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran.


    1. Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, from the Persian  ولایت فقیه is the concept under discussion is that in the twelve Shia Islamic laws, which stipulates that until the reappearance of the “infallible Imam” (sometime before Judgement Day), the religious and social affairs of the Muslim world should be administered by righteous Shi’i jurists (Faqīh). In the system of absolute authority of the jurist, the Faqīh is invested with authority over all public matters, including the governance of states and all religious affairs, such as the temporary suspension of religious obligations, including the Salah prayer or Hajj pilgrimage. According to proponents, obedience to him is considered more significant than the performance of religious obligations. However, this viewpoint is not universally held among Shi’i Islamic scholars. Indeed, some contend that guardianship should be limited to a more circumscribed scope, encompassing only matters such as mediating disputes and providing guardianship for orphaned children, the mentally incapable, and others lacking someone to protect their interests. ↩︎


  • A history in five acts – Act one: Mossadegh.

    The setting is Iran in the year 1882. Tehran. A child was born. His father, Mirza, held the position of Minister of Finance in Iran, while his mother, Najm, was related to the ruling Qajar dynasty 1. At the age of ten, Mohammad was bereaved of his father, who passed away due to cholera. He was subsequently left to care for his mother and sister.

    At the age of 12, the monarch Nasir al-Din Shah bestowed upon him the title of “Mossadegh al-Saltaneh“. Subsequently, he adopted the surname “Mossadegh“, which translates as “true and authentic“.

    His professional life commenced at the age of 15, when he was designated Mostofi (Chief of Finance) of Khorosan Province in honour of his father.

    The constitutionalist movement of 1905–1911 held active participation in the events that led to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, thus substituting the former system of arbitrary monarchical rule. In 1906, at the age of 24, he was elected to the first Majles (Parliament) as a representative of the people of Esfahan. However, he withdrew his name from consideration, since he was below the legal age requirement.

    He pursued his studies in political science in Tehran, subsequently continuing his education in Paris. During his sojourn in Paris, the young man exhibited symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome. This ultimately compelled him to return to Iran.

    Subsequently, he relocated to Switzerland to pursue his Law education. In 1914, he became the first Iranian to be awarded a doctorate in law, and returned to his homeland on the eve of the First World War.

    In 1917, he was employed by the government in the capacity of Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, with the objective of combating corruption. In 1919, the subject self-exiled to Switzerland in protest at an agreement between Iran and Britain. The agreement stipulated the transfer of responsibility for the supervision of Iran’s army and financial systems to British advisers. Following the rejection of the agreement by the Majles, he returned to Iran.

    Following his return to Iran, he was invited to assume the role of governor of Fars province. However, a few months later, he resigned in protest at the 1921 British-inspired coup in Tehran2, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925.

    Following his tenure as governor of Fars, he assumed the role of Finance Minister in the government of Prime Minister Ghavam. Subsequently, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and subsequently served as Governor of the Azerbaijan province for a brief period. In 1923, he was elected to the 5th Majles, thus marking the inception of his historic opposition to the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty by Reza Khan, who was British-supported and at the time the Prime Minister of Iran.

    The reign of Reza Shah was very oppressive and had amongst the greatest threats to the new administration the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic, which had been established in Gilan, and the Kurds of Khorasan. In 1928 he withdrew from social and political activism and retreated to his village, about 100 kilometers outside Tehran, during a decade. 


    In July 1940, Reza Shah’s police squad raided his residence. Despite the absence of incriminating evidence, he was imprisoned in the central prison in Tehran. He was subjected to interrogation and subsequently transferred to a prison in Birjand, with no charges brought against them. As an individual held in high esteem by the community and recognised for his opposition to the arbitrary rule of Reza Shah, he was anticipated to be targeted for assassination.


    By the age of 13, Khadijeh, his daughter, had been profoundly traumatised by her father’s violent arbitrary arrest and was subsequently institutionalised in psychiatric hospitals for the remainder of her life.

    In November 1940, Reza Shah released him and transferred Mossadegh to Ahmedabad (India), where he was to reside until his death. A year later his house arrest ended when the British forced the abdication of Reza Shah and his 22 years old ascended to the throne.

    As a consequence of the events which took place in 1944, Mossadegh was elected with overwhelming support as Tehran representative, thus returning to political activities. During his tenure, he was instrumental in the fight for Iran’s political and economic independence from foreign influence. A key element of this was the renegotiation of the unfavourable oil agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a move that garnered significant popular support.

    The contemporary history of Iran has been inextricably linked to oil, a highly sought-after energy source by the West. The origins of this matter can be traced back to 1901, when an exclusive rights agreement was granted to William Knox D’Arcy, a British national, for the purpose of oil exploration. This agreement was valid for a period of 60 years.

    The issue of exploitation in Iran’s southern provinces is a contentious one. The year 1908 marked the discovery of oil in the region, leading to the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In the period preceding the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the British government acquired a 51% stake in the company’s shares. The British thus established a beachhead and effectively colonised the southern west corner of Iran, exerting a direct and indirect influence on the political affairs of the entire country. APOC demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the principles of equitable remuneration by withholding a substantial portion of the agreed profit sharing payment to Iran, amounting to a mere 16%. This egregious act was further compounded by a flagrant display of disdain and racial prejudice towards Iranian oil workers within their own country. The situation reached a critical juncture in July 1946, when approximately 6,000 Iranian oil workers initiated a strike in the oil city of Aghajari. The conflict with government troops resulted in significant fatalities and injuries among the workers, with more than 200 casualties.

    Mossadegh’s objective was to terminate 150 years of British political interference, economic exploitation and the plundering of Iran’s national resources, and to proceed with the nationalisation of the oil industry. The primary objective was not revenue generation, but rather, the attainment of independence from the British.

    The initial presentation of the nationalisation plan to the Majles “Oil Commission” was made on 8 March 1951. The following day, a coalition of several political parties held a major rally in support of the nationalisation of the oil industry. On the occasion of the Iranian New Year, which was celebrated on 20 March 1951, the National Front Bill for Oil nationalisation was accepted by the Senate. Exactly one month later, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was nominated for the position of prime minister, which he subsequently won by securing the support of almost 90% of the representatives present.

    The dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (hereafter AIOC) led to an escalation in tensions between Iran and Britain. In response, the British government implemented economic sanctions and cautioned military intervention. In June 1951, the Iranian government uncovered a British spy network that exposed subversive activities by a significant number of politicians and journalists.

    In response to the aforementioned events, the Iranian government took the decision to close the British consulate. In October 1951, Prime Minister Mossadegh travelled to New York with the intention of defending Iran’s right to nationalise its oil industry in front of the UN Security Council. He then proceeded to Washington, where he engaged in a meeting with President Truman, but ultimately did not achieve his objective.

    Upon his return to Iran in November 1951, he made a stopover in Cairo, where he was greeted by a group of admirers who had gathered to express their enthusiasm for his return.

    In June 1952, Jue presented nearly 200 documents to the International Court in the Netherlands. These documents revealed the highly exploitative nature of the AIOC and the extent of its political intervention into the Iranian political system.

    Upon returning to Iran, it became evident that the economic and security conditions were rapidly deteriorating, and that the subversive activities of foreign powers were increasing. In July 1952, Mossadegh submitted a formal request to the monarch, Reza Shah, who concurrently served as the head of the military, seeking to assume control of the armed forces. The Shah’s refusal to comply led Mossadegh to tender his immediate resignation as Prime Minister.

    On the following day, the nomination of the new Prime Minister, Ahmad Ghavam, was announced. He was selected by the Shah, at the behest of the British and American governments. Massive protests occurred, resulting in hundreds of casualties. Intimidated by the people’s support for Mossadegh, the Shah’s pointed Mossadegh to the dual role of prime minister and minister of defense. In the ensuing days, the International Court delivered its decision in favour of Iran with regard to the ongoing oil-related dispute. Subsequently, the UN Security Council dismissed the British complaint against Iran. At this juncture, Moosadegh wielded considerable political influence, both within Iran and across the broader Middle Eastern region.

    As a political leader of Iran, he was responsible for the sponsorship of legislation for independent court systems, the defence of freedom of religion and political affiliation, and the implementation of social reforms. He was a defender of the rights of women, workers and peasants, created a fund to pay for rural development projects and followed a principle of negative equilibrium, an idea that led to the formation of the non-allied nations, refusing also to grant the oil concession to the soviet Union. The objective of the programme was to foster national self-sufficiency, balance the budget, increase non-oil productions and create a trade balance. The policies enacted by the aforementioned leader were often met with opposition from the Shah, in addition to the governments of Britain and the United States.

    Concurrently, the British government pursued a policy of subverting Mossadegh’s authority, fomenting domestic discord, and intensifying the global embargo on Iranian oil exports, while also freezing Iranian assets. In the face of mounting challenges and setbacks, the British initiated a collaborative effort with the US CIA, formulating a strategy to depose the democratically elected government in power.

    On 15 August 1953, the CIA, with the involvement of the Shah and other Iranian collaborators, drafted a plan entitled Operation Ajax. This plan was intended to dislodge Mossadegh from power; however, it was unsuccessful. The second attempt was made on 19 August 1953, and the violent overthrow of the government was accomplished. The second attempt was made on 19 August 1953, and the violent overthrow of the government was accomplished. Mossadegh managed to evade capture, yet his residence was subsequently raided and set alight.

    On the subsequent day, Mossadegh submitted to the authorities and was promptly imprisoned. During this event, hundreds were killed or wounded. He was subjected to a military trial on charges of treason on 19 December 1953. He was convicted of treason and consequently sentenced to a period of solitary confinement lasting three years, followed by house arrest for the remainder of his life. He passed away at the age of 84.

    Mossadegh committed the grave transgression by endeavouring to safeguard the interests of his nation, namely by ensuring the continued nationalisation of Iran’s oil industry, with a view to circumventing the political and economic exploitation perpetrated by the British and the US Americans.


    1. The Qajar dynasty was founded in 1789, by the clan of the Turkoman Qajar tribe. It lasted until 12 of december of 1925, when Iran’s Majilis, convening as a constituent assembly declared Reza Shah as the new shah of Pahlavi Iran (the Imperial State of Iran). ↩︎
    2. The coup d’état of 1921 was partially assisted by the British government, which wished to halt the Bolshevik’s penetration of Iran, particularly because of the threat it posed to the British Raj. The British Raj was the colonial rule of the British Crown on the Indian subcontinent, lasting from 1858 to 1947. ↩︎


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